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Hiding Behind Precedent: Why Panetti v. Quarterman Will
Create Confusion for Incompetent Death Row Inmates*
On the morning of September 8, 1992, Scott Panetti awoke
before dawn, shaved his head, dressed himself in camouflage, grabbed
a shotgun and a rifle, and drove to the home of his estranged wife's
parents.1 He broke into the house, shot and killed his parents-in-law,
and then held his wife and daughter hostage.2 In 1995, Mr. Panetti
defended himself in his capital murder trial after undergoing a
competency evaluation, which revealed that he "suffered from a
fragmented personality, delusions, and hallucinations," but he was
nonetheless deemed competent to stand trial and to waive his right to
counsel.3 Mr. Panetti presented his case to the jury wearing a cowboy
outfit, complete with boots and a hat, and attempted to subpoena
John F. Kennedy, the Pope, and Jesus Christ.4 Nevertheless, Scott
5
Panetti was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death.
On June 28, 2007, the Supreme Court of the United States
delivered a decision in Panetti's case which, although wrapped in
language purporting to simply uphold precedent, will in effect alter
the current application of the Eighth Amendment. In Panetti v.
Quarterman,6 the Court, in a five-to-four decision, held that Scott
Panetti was not competent to be executed based on the Eighth
Amendment's bar against cruel and unusual punishment unless he
had a "rational understanding" of his punishment.7 This decision was
a departure from the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment most
courts had adopted after the decision in Ford v. Wainwrights the first
* Copyright © 2008 by Lauren E. Perry.
1. Brief for Petitioner at 7, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007)

(No. 06-6407).
2. Id. After taking his wife and daughter to his bunkhouse, Scott Panetti informed
them that he was not yet sure whether he was going to shoot them. He held them until
dawn before finally releasing them; he surrendered later that afternoon. See Brief for
Respondent at 2, Panetti, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (No. 06-6407).
3. Panetti,551 U.S. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2848.
4. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 11-12. Mr. Panetti's appearance at trial
was described as "like an old TV western" and included pants tucked into cowboy boots, a
cowboy-style shirt, a bandana, and a cowboy hat which hung on his back. Id. at 11 n.9.
5. Id. at 15.
6. 551 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007).
7. Id. at

__, 127

S. Ct. at 2862.

8. 477 U.S. 399 (1986); see, e.g., Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 170 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the Ford standard only requires a finding that the defendant understand that
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case to hold that the Constitution barred the execution of the insane. 9
However, while the Supreme Court expanded the application of the
Eighth Amendment and narrowed the standard for competency in
Panetti, it gave very little direction as to how the new standard would
function. Rather, as the dissenters point out, the majority did nothing
more than present a "half-baked holding that leaves the details of the
insanity standard for the District Court to work out."1 This new
standard, then, will likely create more confusion in lower courts, lead
to higher costs due to increased petitions, and establish a circular
system which will benefit neither capital defendants nor societal
interests. Thus, the Court would be wise to establish a bright-line rule
for determining the competency necessary to be executed under the
Eighth Amendment.
This Recent Development will argue that, despite the Court's
emphatic affirmation that its decision lies within the standard
articulated by the concurrence in Ford, the Court, in fact, established
a new standard for determining the requisite level of competency for
execution. Furthermore, it will explain that this new standard will
significantly affect the lower courts' ability to render decisions in two
ways: first, they will be faced with the daunting task of defining
competency in light of Panetti, and second, they will be forced to
handle the inevitable increase in the number of petitions and hearings
likely to be filed. Additionally, this Recent Development will
illustrate that, prior to the Panetti decision, the majority of lower
courts applied a fairly uniform interpretation of competency to be
executed. Therefore, the new standard will likely create confusion
and variance in application, which will have further negative effects
on judicial economy. Finally, it will explain that courts would be well
served to create a more succinct test for competency and to use a
clear, easily applied definition throughout the criminal justice system.
Before discussing the Court's opinion in Panetti, a brief
procedural discussion about the methods by which death row inmates
may challenge their sentences based on claims of incompetency would
be helpful. In Ford, the Supreme Court addressed for the first time
"whether the Constitution places a substantive restriction on the
State's power to take the life of an insane prisoner."" In finding that
the Eighth Amendment does place some restriction on the execution
he is to be punished via execution and that this punishment is a consequence of the
criminal conduct).
9. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 409-10.
10. Panetti,551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2873 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
11. Ford,477 U.S. at 405.

1070

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

of the insane, the Court implicitly created the right for death row
inmates to file federal habeas petitions claiming incompetency to be
executed.12 This petition, however, can only be made after an
execution is imminent, meaning that an execution date is set, because
"the issue of sanity is properly considered in proximity with the
execution."13 Therefore, once an inmate files a ripe Ford claim, a
federal habeas petition in which the petitioner claims incompetency,14
his execution date is stayed until his claim of incompetency can be
adjudicated. 5 Adjudication of federal habeas petitions is governed
by 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255, which create certain requirements,
including mandates that, with few exceptions, all claims must be made
in a single habeas petition16 and that all state remedies must be
exhausted before a federal petition is heard. 7 Once a federal habeas
proceeding is instituted, " 'a federal evidentiary hearing is required
unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full hearing reliably
found the relevant facts.' "18 Thus, a death row inmate can claim
incompetency to be executed once an execution date is set, at which
point the inmate is entitled to a full and fair hearing on the matter.
This was precisely the type of petition that Scott Panetti filed.
The Court in Panetti addressed two distinct issues. First, the
Court held that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA") 19 did not bar Scott Panetti from filing a Ford claim,
despite the fact that it was the first time he raised such a claim and it
was his second federal habeas petition. 20 The Court rooted this
decision in a discussion of judicial efficiency and conservation of

12. See id. at 409-10 (establishing that a defendant who does not meet a certain level
of competency cannot be executed based on the Eighth Amendment's ban on cruel and
unusual punishment, and establishing as a corollary that a claim of such incompetency can
be asserted in federal habeas petitions). These types of habeas petitions have since been
referred to as Ford claims.
13. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 406 (1993); see also Martinez-Villareal v. Stewart,
118 F.3d 628, 630 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997) (noting that performing a competency determination
before a warrant for execution has been given would be futile and would "certainly have
to be repeated when the time for execution finally arrives").
14. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. See 28 U.S.C. § 2251 (2000).
16. Id. § 2244(b).
17. Id. § 2254(b)(1).
18. Ford, 477 U.S. at 411 (quoting Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312-13 (1963)).
19. See § 2244(b)(2) (providing that "[a] claim presented in a second or successive
habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application
shall be dismissed," except under certain, narrow circumstances, which are not applicable
in Mr. Panetti's case).
20. See § 2244(b)(1); Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S ..... 127 S.Ct. 2842, 2854
(2007).
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resources. Thus, it held that a rule which "require[d] prisoners to file
unripe Ford claims neither respects the limited legal resources

available to the States nor encourages the exhaustion of state
remedies.",2' The decision, then, suggests that perhaps Ford claims
"deserve a special (and unjustified) exemption '22 from the AEDPA.

It is a stretch to fit this exemption within the plain language of the
statute, and the Court held in the same term that the mere fact that a
claim is unripe during an initial filing is not enough for an exception. 3

Thus, since this petition was not barred by the statute, the Court went
on to address the procedures the Fifth Circuit followed to establish

competency and the merits of the claim that Scott Panetti was
incompetent to be executed under the Eighth Amendment.24

In assessing the lower court's adjudication of Scott Panetti's
claim of incompetency, the Supreme Court found that it had failed to
adhere to the appropriate procedures required by the Federal

Constitution. 25 Therefore, under federal law, the Supreme Court was
required to consider the claim without deference to the lower court's
decision.2 6

The Court then determined, upon assessment of the

merits, that the standard used by the Fifth Circuit was "too
restrictive" and did not afford Scott Panetti the protections
guaranteed by the Eighth Amendment.2

7

The standard used by the

Fifth Circuit "require[d] [that] the petitioner know no more than the
21. Panetti,551 U.S. at __ 127 S.Ct. at 2854 (suggesting that the filing of unripe Ford
claims, claims which seek to stay an execution based on incompetency before there is any
indication that the inmate is incompetent, or claims which seek to stay execution before
execution is imminent, is a waste of judicial resources).
22. Id. at -, 127 S.Ct. at 2867 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has
carved out an exception in the AEDPA for Ford claims because, under the statutory
language, the claim should be considered second and successive).
23. See Burton v. Stewart, 551 U.S. -,...127 S.Ct. 793, 797 (2007) (holding that the
mere fact that a claim was unripe during the filing of the initial habeas application does
not mean it can be raised in a successive application since an unripe claim alone shows that
state remedies have not been exhausted).
24. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
25. Panetti, 551 U.S. at _ 127 S.Ct. at 2855-56. Under Ford, once a substantial
showing of insanity is made, a defendant is entitled to a " 'full and fair hearing' " on the
merits of his Ford claim. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(2) (1982)). In this case, the Court found that the lower court's failure to provide
a hearing allowing Scott Panetti to present his own expert evidence violated his right to a
fair hearing. Panetti,551 U.S. at -_,
127 S. Ct. at 2856; see Ford, 477 U.S. at 425 (Powell,
J.,
concurring) (noting that, while there is not a requirement of a "full-scale 'sanity trial,'
procedures should comport with basic notions of fundamental fairness).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000) (stating that a federal court can only grant a
habeas petition and review that petition on its merits if the state court's adjudication of the
claim was based on an "unreasonable application of[] clearly established Federal law").
27. Panetti,551 U.S. at -, 127 S.Ct. at 2860.
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fact of his impending execution and the factual predicate for the
execution. ' 28 While acknowledging that the Ford decision did not
actually define competency or the precise standard for determining it,
the Court nevertheless held that the Fifth Circuit's test for
competency "rests on a flawed interpretation of Ford.' 29 The Court
noted that in order to meet the Ford standard, a lower court needed
to find not only that a prisoner "knows that he is going to be executed
and that the execution will result in death," but also that the prisoner
has a "rational understanding" of the relationship between the two.30
This articulation of the Ford standard, then, demanded that Scott
Panetti's case be remanded for further inquiry into his rational
understanding.3" Scott Panetti professed a belief that the State's
purported reason for execution (the murder of his ex-parents-in-law)
was a "sham" and that he was really going to be executed to be
silenced from preaching.32 The issue to be addressed on remand,
therefore, was whether this belief "put an awareness of a link
between a crime and its punishment in a context so far removed from
reality that the punishment can serve no proper purpose."33
In articulating this decision, the Court uses vague language3 4 and
neglects to establish a standard or easily applied rule for deciding the
level of competency required for a constitutional execution. Indeed,
the decision is rooted in the desire to maintain precedent, a precedent
which itself never defined "sanity" in the first place. In Ford, the
Court for the first time held that the Eighth Amendment forbade a
State from executing a mentally ill person.3 5 This decision was

28. Panetti v. Dretke, 401 F. Supp. 2d 702, 711 (W.D. Tex. 2004).

29. Panetti,551 U.S. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2860.
30. Id. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2860-61 (finding that the district court's analysis of
competency, which was based on the defendant's awareness that he had committed, and
was convicted of, murder, awareness that he was going to be executed, and awareness of
the state's given reason for his execution, was not supported by the holding in Ford
because factual awareness and rational understanding are different and the Ford decision
requires analysis of the latter).
31. Id. at ,127 S. Ct. at 2863.
32. Id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2859, 2862; see Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 18-19
(noting that Scott Panetti believed he was in a "struggle with the devil" and that his
approaching execution was part of a "satanic conspiracy to prevent him from preaching
the Gospel").
33. Panetti,551 U.S. at

_

127 S. Ct. at 2862.

34. For example, Justice Kennedy stated, "a prisoner's awareness of the State's
rationale ... is not the same as a rational understanding." Id. Later, he also wrote that "a
concept like rational understanding is difficult to define," but that this term does not
require that the prisoner "be considered 'normal,' or even 'rational,' in a layperson's
understanding of those terms." Id.
35. See Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,410 (1986).
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grounded in language highlighting " 'evolving standards of decency,' "
and it outlined procedures that should be followed in order to assure
36
justice and fairness for a capital defendant.
While the Panetti Court purports to be simply applying a logical
extension of Ford, this claim is less than compelling. First, Ford was
decided absent a majority opinion.37 In fact, the language which was
adopted as controlling is from Justice Powell's concurrence,3" an
opinion in which no other Justice joined. His opinion suggests that

the Constitution forbids the punishment "only of those who are
unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer and why they are
to suffer it."39 Furthermore, his competency analysis hinges on the
requirement that defendants on death row "know the fact of their
impending execution and the reason for it."4
Nothing in this
language suggests that competency demands that death row inmates

actually believe the reason for execution given by the State or even
understand that reason.
The Panetti Court further stated that "the Ford opinions

nowhere indicate that delusions are irrelevant to 'comprehen[sion]' or
'aware[ness]' if they so impair the prisoner's concept of reality that he
cannot reach a rational understanding... [and] [i]f anything, the Ford
majority suggests the opposite."'" However, even this assertion is
flawed, as the Ford "majority" suggests nothing of the sort. Rather,
the majority does not address a standard at all. Justice Powell's
concurrence is the only opinion which even attempts to define sanity,
but it never addresses delusions, and the opinions taken as a whole
36. See id. at 406 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (Warren, C.J.,
plurality)) (recognizing that execution of the insane may be unconstitutional even if it
would have been allowed under historical precedent and the common law because it
"'mark[s] progress of a maturing society' " (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958) (Warren, C.J., plurality))); see also supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text
(describing these procedures, which entitle a defendant to a full and fair hearing).
37. The Ford decision was a splintered one. Justice Marshall maintained a five-tofour majority in holding that the execution of an insane person would violate the Eighth
Amendment. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 410. However, there was no majority with regard to
the procedure that should be followed in assessing insanity or the actual meaning of
insanity, and Justice Powell's concurrence has come to be regarded as controlling. See id.
at 418 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Panetti,551 U.S. at
-'
127 S. Ct. at 2856.
38. See infra note 66 and accompanying text (citing various cases that adopted
language from Justice Powell's concurrence).
39. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 422 (Powell, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (stating that because Mr. Ford did not understand that he was going to die and
because he was unable to connect his execution to the crime, the death penalty was cruel
and unusual punishment and violated the Eighth Amendment).
40. Id. at 422.
41. Panetti, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2861 (first and second alterations in original).
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seem to suggest little more than that "awareness" should be
considered. Thus, the need for "rational understanding" certainly
resembles a new standard much more than it does a mere application
or extension of the Ford holding.
As the dissent in Panetti vividly points out, the Court, by
purporting to simply apply Ford, "imposes a new standard for
determining incompetency" without ever engaging in the Eighth
Amendment analysis which should define the limits of this new
standard.4 2 Indeed, Panetti can be seen as establishing a new
requirement that must be met before finding a death row inmate
competent to be executed, the requirement of "rational
understanding." The Court's decision to impose a new standard in
this fashion, without a full Eighth Amendment inquiry and without
defining insanity, must serve some greater purpose. The Court, as the
dissent puts it, "bends over backwards to allow Panetti to bring his
Ford claim despite no evidence that his condition has worsened" and
despite the fact that it required a "special (and unjustified) exception"
to the AEDPA.43
The decision to hear this claim on its merits required jumping
though numerous hoops before the Court could decide that a
"rational understanding" was necessary.'
First, the Court had to
hold that it could hear the habeas petition through the creation of an
exemption to the AEDPA." Second, the Court had to find that the
procedure the lower court followed violated the standards set out in
Ford, so that it would be able to determine the case on its merits.46
The Court followed all of these complicated steps so that it could hear
the claim and then stopped short of making an Eighth Amendment
analysis and instead claimed to be logically extending the ruling of
Ford.47 Then, after all of this, it remanded the case to the lower court
42. Id. at _
127 S. Ct. at 2864 (Thomas, J., dissenting). The dissenters, Justice
Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Alito, allege that "[t]he

Court refuses to acknowledge that Ford simply does not resolve this question one way or
the other." Id. at __, 127 S. Ct. at 2874 n.12.
43. Id. at _ 127 S. Ct. at 2864; see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
44. See Panetti,551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2859-60.
45. See id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2866-67 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
46. See id. at _, 127 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (majority opinion).
47. A full Eighth Amendment analysis would include: (1) considering whether
execution of the insane would have been viewed as " 'cruel and unusual at the time that
the Bill of Rights was adopted,' " id. at _
127 S. Ct. at 2874 (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 405 (1986)); (2) considering whether the
punishment would be "deemed cruel and unusual according to modern 'standards of
decency,' " id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560-61
(2005)); and (3) "looking for 'objective evidence of contemporary values,' " id. at -, 127
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and demanded that the lower court muddle through the meaning of

"rational understanding" and its appropriate application to Scott
Panetti's professed beliefs.48 The Court went out of its way to fit

these facts into the Ford format only to heighten the requirement for
competency when this could have been accomplished just as easily by
an Eighth Amendment analysis. Considering the importance of this

decision for the death penalty in this country, perhaps the Court
feared making the tough decision and, therefore, declined to establish

a bright-line test.
The importance of this decision demands a look into the
complexities and interconnectedness of mental illness and criminal
courts or, more specifically, capital offenders. The decision to extend

the definition of insanity by expanding it to "rational understanding"
will affect hundreds of defendants on death row. While the decision

in this case may seem at first to "deal[] with an issue that arises rarely,
is doctrinally narrow, and has little connection with other domains of
criminal and constitutional jurisprudence," its impact has the capacity

to be much broader.49 It is estimated that at least sixty people who
have been executed in the United States since 1983 have been
diagnosed as mentally ill or mentally retarded." Likewise, although
hard statistics would be difficult to compile, it has been estimated that

five to ten percent of people on death row have a "serious mental
illness."51 Thus, hundreds of people on death row are afflicted with a
mental illness and have a stake in the new standard for determining

competency. 2 While the Court in Panetti contends that this new
S. Ct. at 2874 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 312 (2002)). See also Ford, 477
U.S. at 406-10 (noting, after undertaking a full Eighth Amendment analysis, that based on
the totality of the factors, execution of the insane is cruel and unusual).
48. See Panetti,551 U.S. at , 127 S. Ct. at 2863.
49. Richard J. Bonnie, Panetti v. Quarterman: Mental Illness, the Death Penalty, and
Human Dignity, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 257,257 (2007).
50. See ACLU, Mental Illness and the Death Penalty in the United States (Jan. 31,
2005), http://www.aclu.org/capital/mentalillness/10617pub20050131.html; see also Press
Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Eighty-Nine Percent of State
Adult Correctional Facilities Provide Mental Health Services for Prisoners (July 15, 2001),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/mhts00pr.htm (noting that, in 2000,
about sixteen percent of all inmates were identified as mentally ill and that one in ten state
inmates were receiving psychotropic medication).
51. ACLU, supra note 50. The ACLU defines mental illness as "[a]ny of various
conditions characterized by impairment of an individual's normal cognitive, emotional, or
behavioral functioning, and caused by social, psychological, biochemical, genetic, or other
factors." Id. Further, it lists bipolar disorder, borderline personality disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, schizoaffective disorder, schizophrenia, depression, and
recurrent thoughts of death or suicide as those most common to death row prisoners. Id.
52. As of December 31, 2006, there were 3,350 inmates on death row. See ACLU
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROJECT, DEATH PENALTY 101, at 1 (2007), available at
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standard will be limited in its application to those inmates who suffer
from "severe mental illness,"53 focusing primarily on psychotic
disorders and delusions, the ruling will not be so confined.
Scott Panetti was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and
schizophrenia,54 a disease that affects approximately 2.4 million
American adults.5 Likewise, "on any given day, there are more than
four times as many people with schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and
major depression in our nation's jails and prisons as there are in
hospitals," as well as "hundreds of people with schizophrenia and
other severe mental illness on death row around the country."5 6 Thus,
hundreds of death row inmates suffer from the types of delusions and
psychotic disorders that the Court highlights, and it is these inmates
that will potentially be affected by the move to a higher standard.
In addition to death row inmates who have well-documented
mental illnesses, there are also new cases of mental impairment which
arise in death row inmates on a regular basis. The so-called "death
row phenomenon,"5 7 the theory that an inmate's mental health
deteriorates while on death row, has the potential to render formerly
competent prisoners incompetent once they reach this new threshold
and can show a lack of Irational understanding." The phenomenon
theory suggests that "death row inmates live in a state of constant
uncertainty over when they will be executed" and that "this isolation
and anxiety results in a sharp deterioration of the[] mental capacity"
of some inmates.58 Therefore, the length of time an inmate remains
on death row can be directly relevant to competency. Recently, the
http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-upload-file758_29292.pdf; see also BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS,

U.S.

DEP'T

OF

JUSTICE,

CAPITAL

PUNISHMENT

STATISTICS,

http://www.ojp.usdoj.govlbjs/cp.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2008) (noting that at the end of
2006, 3,228 prisoners were on death row).
53. Panetti,551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
54. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 7. Scott Panetti suffered from severe mental
illness long before his criminal trial. He "was hospitalized over a dozen times in numerous
institutions for schizophrenia, schizoaffective disorder, bipolar disorder, depression," and
various other mental illnesses. Id.
55. See NAT'L INST. OF MENTAL HEALTH, THE NUMBERS COUNT: MENTAL
DISORDERS IN AMERICA, http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-numberscount-mental-disorders-in-america.shtml (last visited Apr. 10, 2008).
56. Ronald S. Honberg, The Injustice of Imposing the Death Penalty on People with
Severe Mental Illnesses, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1153, 1153-54 (2005).
57. The death row phenomenon is the idea that periods of long confinement in harsh
conditions can lead to deterioration of an inmate's mental condition and can cause an
inmate to become "suicidal, delusional, and insane." DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., TIME
ON DEATH ROW, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=1397 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2008).
58. Stephen Blank, Killing Time: The Process of Waiving Appeal, The Michael Ross
Death Penalty Cases, 14 J.L. & POL'Y 735, 752 (2006).
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time an inmate waits for execution has increased steadily, from
seventy-four months in 1984 to 145 months in 2006.19
This phenomenon, combined with the harsh conditions on death
row, 6 could "easily lead to physical and mental deterioration,'
which could significantly affect the number of claims brought under
the new standard. Similarly, the last-minute staying of executions
will, logically, only exacerbate the problem. 62 With hundreds of
inmates on death row possibly suffering from delusions, the extension
of the Ford standard could seriously increase the number of Ford
claims filed and adjudicated.
Because the new standard has such a potentially extensive
impact, the way it will be interpreted and applied in the lower courts
is of vast importance, especially since these are literally life-and-death
decisions. The death penalty is recognized under federal law and in
thirty-eight states, 63 and "[c]urrently, no states that recognize the
death penalty [categorically] prohibit the execution of people with
mental illness."' Therefore, different courts could interpret this new
standard in a variety of different ways. While the Court contends that
a "rational understanding" requirement is a mere extension of the
Ford holding, 65 none of the lower federal courts adopted such a
requirement when adjudicating a death row inmate's competency to
be executed after Ford was handed down. Five federal circuit courts
59. See DEATH PENALTY INFO CTR., supranote 57.
60. See Blank, supra note 58, at 753 (noting that death row inmates are isolated from
other prisoners for up to twenty-three hours a day in addition to being "excluded from
prison educational and employment programs[] and sharply restricted in terms of
visitation and exercise"); Stuart Grassian, Psychopathological Effects of Solitary
Confinement, 140 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1450, 1451-52 (1983) (tracing the mental health
deterioration in fourteen inmates after a stint of solitary confinement, which included
conditions similar to most death row experiences in which an inmate lives in a room
furnished with only a steel bed, steel table and stool, and an open steel toilet, all lit by only
a single sixty-watt light bulb).
61. Patrick Hudson, Does the Death Row Phenomenon Violate a Prisoner'sHuman
Rights Under InternationalLaw?, 11 EUR. J. INT'L LAW 833, 836 (2000); see id. at 834-36
(discussing the death row phenomenon generally and suggesting that the increase in wait
time for execution coupled with confinement to small cells for up to twenty-three hours a
day and restricted privileges not only reduces sanity but also violates notions of basic
human rights).
62. Last-minute stays of execution have become a common occurrence in capital
cases. In the first quarter of 2007 alone, eighteen scheduled executions were stayed in five
different states. See Andrew Cohen, Staying Executions: After Expanding the Death
Penalty, the Pendulum Swings Back, HUM. RTS., Spring 2007, at 21, 21.
63. See Honberg, supra note 56, at 1159.
64. Id. (noting that, despite the fact that states often impose restrictions on the
execution of the mentally ill, no states have prohibited it outright).
65. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. -, -, 127 S. Ct. 2842, 2861 (2007).

1078

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 86

have addressed this issue, and each has applied an interpretation of
Justice Powell's concurrence similar to that of the Fifth Circuitnamely, holding that the defendant need only be aware of the fact
that he is going to be executed and of the reason for it.66 None of the
courts have extended the Ford standard to "rational understanding"
the way the Court does in the Panetti decision, despite having heard
cases involving defendants who suffer from severe and delusional
mental disorders, such as schizophrenia. Consequently, since no
court has yet to hold that Ford demands rational understanding, the
potential for disparate application is a genuine concern.
The new standard the Court creates calls for "rational
understanding" but leaves the definition and application of this term
to the musing of the lower courts. The failure of the Court to define
"rational understanding" could certainly reflect an intentional policy
decision, but it also leaves the lower courts in the awkward position of
having to define an abstract concept. In fact, it is difficult, if not
impossible, for "someone who has not experienced psychosis firsthand to understand it," even for "defense attorneys and their
experts."67 For instance, in Barnardv. Collins,6 8 the Fifth Circuit was
required to determine the level of awareness of a defendant who at
times knew the factual reason for his execution but, based on his
delusions, attributed negative occurrences to a conspiracy against him

66. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Fifth Circuit's
interpretation of Ford); see also Walton v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 160, 171 (4th Cir. 2006)
(holding that the defendant's understanding that he would be executed and that the
execution is punishment for his conviction of murder is sufficient for a finding of
competency under the Ford standard); Scott v. Mitchell, 2001 FED App. 0166P, 5 (6th
Cir.), 250 F.3d 1011, 1014-15 (holding that incompetency should be found when a
defendant " 'does not have the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and why it was imposed' " and finding that the schizophrenic defendant had not
made a substantial showing that he did not understand the nature of the punishment and
therefore should not be granted a stay of execution (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2949.28(A))); Massie ex rel Kroll v. Woodford, 244 F.3d 1192, 1195 n.1 (9th Cir. 2001)
(citing Ford for the proposition that execution is only forbidden under the Eighth
Amendment when the defendant is "unaware of the punishment they are about to suffer
and why they are to suffer it"); Fearance v. Scott, 56 F.3d 633, 640 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding
that a person must "know the fact of his impending execution and the reason for it" and
finding the defendant competent to be executed, despite a diagnosis of paranoid
schizophrenia); Rector v. Clark, 923 F.2d 570, 572 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding that
competency depends on "(1) whether the petitioner understands that he is to be punished
by execution; and (2) whether petitioner understands why he is being punished," and
rejecting the notion that the defendant must be able to work with his attorney in a
"collaborative" manner).
67. Honberg, supra note 56, at 1162.
68. 13 F.3d 871 (5th Cir. 1994).
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by "Asians, Jews, Blacks, homosexuals, and the Mafia."69 The court
found that Barnard knew his execution was imposed because he had
been found guilty of a crime, but under the new standard, this fact
may not meet the threshold for a finding of rational understanding. It
would depend on how much of his punishment and his actions he
blamed on the "conspiracy." It may also depend on which expert is
asking the questions, how the questions are phrased, and how
Barnard is feeling on that particular day at that particular time.
Furthermore, it is unlikely that the courts will agree on a generally
accepted meaning of the "idea that the prisoner must be able to
understand (or be aware of) the nature and purpose of (or reason for)
the execution."7 ° Additionally, even before this decision, competency
standards were "often misunderstood, and unevenly applied."7 1
Considering all of the possible scenarios, the reasonable differences
of opinion among experts, and the stakes in each case, the Court has
placed the lower courts in a precarious place: they have to decide
how to define and how to discover a death row inmate's "rational
understanding." The new standard will likely begin as a "work in
progress" as the lower courts struggle to draw the line between
overinclusion and underinclusion.
Consequently, disparate
application is likely, though less than desirable.
For example, consider the way the new standard may be applied
in North Carolina and the Fourth Circuit. The Fourth Circuit
recently decided in Walton v. Johnson7 2 that the Ford standard
requires no more than that the defendant Walton " 'understands that
he is sentenced to die by execution' for his crimes, and even more
precisely, that Walton 'understands that to be executed means that he
will die,' " despite the fact that he did not comprehend that death
would be the end.73 The Fourth Circuit did not at any point address
the defendant's rational understanding. In fact, the court ignored his
understanding completely and focused on his factual awareness.74 In
light of the recent Panetti decision, the Fourth Circuit will have to
69. Id. at 876.
70. Richard J. Bonnie, Mentally Ill Prisoners on Death Row: Unsolved Puzzles for
Courts and Legislatures,54 CATH. U. L. REV. 1169, 1172 (2005).
71. Honberg, supra note 56, at 1163.
72. 440 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2006).
73. See id. at 175 (quoting Walton v. Johnson, 306 F. Supp. 2d 597, 600-01 (W.D. Va.
2004), vacated, 407 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2005)) (holding that, although Walton did not
understand that he was not going to come back to life after his execution, he was
competent to be executed under the Ford holding).
74. See Bonnie, supra note 70, at 1173 (noting that understanding the nature of a
proceeding and appreciating its personal application are different and that an analogous
distinction is often drawn between factual understanding and rational understanding).
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reframe its analysis, taking up the issue of competency from square
one. The situation the Fourth Circuit now faces will be very similar to
the situations the other circuits will likely face.
While neither the Fourth Circuit nor the North Carolina courts
have yet addressed the complexities involved in applying the rational
understanding standard when adjudicating a defendant's competency
to be executed, the North Carolina courts have used a similar
standard in other types of competency cases. The North Carolina
courts define competency to be executed in section 15A-1001 of the
General Statutes of North Carolina, which states that a defendant can
not be punished "when by reason of mental illness or defect he is
unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against
him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings,
75
or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner.
However, the use of the term "rational" within the statute has only
been interpreted to require that the defendant be capable of assisting
in his defense by communicating with his attorney in a meaningful
76

way.

This limited application of the term "rational" under the
competency statute can be seen clearly though the case of Guy Tobias
LeGrande,7 a North Carolina death row inmate whose history bears
a striking resemblance to that of Scott Panetti. LeGrande was
allowed to represent himself in his murder trial wearing a Superman
t-shirt, believing he was "receiving signals from Oprah Winfrey and
Dan Rather over the television," and suffering from delusions. 7 The
Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed his conviction after
finding him incompetent both to stand trial and to waive his right to
counsel because he "was able to respond to the court's inquiry in a
75. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1001(a) (2005).
76. Cf Noland v. Dixon, 831 F. Supp. 490, 506-07 (W.D.N.C. 1993) (overruling the
trial court's conclusion that the defendant was competent to be tried and executed in light
of the fact that he suffered from brain damage and mental illnesses, which made
consulting him worthless for his lawyer and further made him " 'incapable of making
rational decisions about his life, his defense or in any significant and rational way
understanding the trial proceedings or his role in them'" (quoting Affidavit of Dr.
Horacek 15)), vacated on other grounds, Noland v. Dixon, 53 F.3d 328 (4th Cir. 1995).
77. Guy Tobias LeGrande was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to
death in North Carolina in April of 1996. His execution is still pending. See State v.
LeGrande, 346 N.C. 718, 730, 487 S.E.2d 727, 733 (1997); see also Andrea Weigl,
Condemned Man Gets 2-Month Break, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), Nov. 28,
2006, at Al (noting that three psychiatrists have been appointed to determine whether
Guy LeGrande is incompetent to be executed despite his refusal to speak to them).
78. ACLU, MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN NORTH CAROLINA: A
DIAGNOSTIC APPROACH 33 (2007), http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/capital/nc-mentalillness_
report2007.pdf.
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manner that demonstrated that he understood the nature of the
proceedings, comprehended the serious nature of his situation, and
was prepared to proceed with his defense in a rational or reasonable
manner."79 Thus, the investigation into the defendant's "rational
understanding" was limited to an inquiry into his ability to assist in his
defense and was not extended to the connection he was able to make
between crime and punishment. Further, while his Ford claim is
currently pending in federal court, an earlier decision in his case
suggests that Guy LeGrande would have to "demonstrate a change
from his current mental condition," a mental condition which was
assessed without discussion of his ability to rationally connect his
criminal conduct to his possible punishment.8" Given the fact that
LeGrande is unwilling to cooperate with mental health experts, a
showing of a heightened level of mental illness may be impossible and
an inquiry into "rational understanding" precluded outright.8
The likelihood that such a complex standard, handed down with
such little guidance, will be applied uniformly is dubious at best.
Lower courts will be forced to interpret and analyze each defendant's
"rational understanding," a standard upon.which even experts have
trouble agreeing.82 Indeed, North Carolina prosecutors are still
seeking the death penalty in the case of Tommy Lee Holiday, a
defendant who is depressed, hears voices, and refuses medical
treatment from the prison staff, despite the obvious possibility that,
were he to receive the death penalty, his rational understanding
would be in question.83 As this decision illustrates, application of this
new standard will be further complicated by the likely increase in the
amount of petitions that will be filed under the new standard. The
decision in Panetti created a new threshold for competency to be
executed, but it left the task of defining this standard to the lower
79. See LeGrande, 346 N.C. at 724, 487 S.E.2d at 730.
80. See LeGrande v. Lee, No. 1:99CV00314, 2005 WL 1869223, at *13 (M.D.N.C. Aug.
5, 2005) (finding that petitioner's Ford claim was not ripe since his execution was not yet
pending, but that once his execution was pending, he could file the claim and show a
change in mental condition).
81. See ACLU, supra note 78, at 33. Furthermore, North Carolina has often
permitted mentally ill defendants "to refuse psychological evaluations." Id. at 21. For
instance, in the 1979 capital murder trial of James Hutchins, his refusal to cooperate with
the retained psychiatrist did not bar his conviction or execution, despite his eventual
diagnosis of a "severe mental disorder characterized by paranoid delusions, disturbed
judgment, and hallucinations." Id. at 22.
82. See Honberg, supra note 56, at 1162.
83. See Eric Klamut, Prosecutors To Seek Death Penalty in Kornegay Case, ROCKY
MOUNT TELEGRAM (Rocky Mount, N.C.), Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.rockymount
telegram.com/biz/content/news/stories/2007/10/24/death.html.
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courts, putting them in a position that is even more precarious than
the Court disclosed. The change in threshold will increase the
amount of Ford petitions which are filed, while simultaneously
increasing the costs of hearing these petitions.
The Court's requirement of "rational understanding," as
previously mentioned, will replace the test that is currently used in
most jurisdictions with a new, vague standard. In other words, the
Panetti decision rendered the standard for competency less clear.
Furthermore, it lowered a defendant's necessary showing to prove
incompetency to be executed. Consequently, more defendants will
attempt to meet the burden because the standard is more vague, and
more defendants will actually meet their burdens because the
threshold is lower.84 Thus, even though the Court in Panetti rested its
decision to hear the Ford petition on judicial economy,85 the result
will not decrease the number of Ford claims which will reach the
courts; in fact, the number will increase. This increase in petitions,
then, will invariably put extra pressure on the courts to assess
"rational understanding."
In addition to increased petitions, the decision will also adversely
affect judicial economy because of the procedures now mandated by
the Court in assessing an inmate's claim of incompetency to be
executed. The Supreme Court held that the Texas court did not give
Scott Panetti a fair hearing and concluded that the defendant should
have been allowed to present his own expert evidence.86 Allowing
both sides to admit expert evidence will increase the time and
resources needed to adjudicate a Ford claim. Furthermore, the
malleable standard leaves room for varying opinions, even among
experts, as to whether rational understanding exists. Thus, courts will
be forced to analyze more evidence, hear more expert testimony, and
spend more time considering whether a particular defendant
manifests a "rational understanding."

84. See Bonnie, supra note 49, at 282 (noting the possibility that "the 'rational
understanding' test, admittedly less determinate than a 'formal understanding' test, will
invite more claims and will lead to exemption in 'too many' cases").
85. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
86. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S -,.. ,127 S. Ct. 2842, 2858 (2007). While the
Court determined that Scott Panetti should have been allowed to present his own expert
testimony, this expert would have been paid for by the government, thus increasing the
cost of such a hearing. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e)(1) (2004) ("[C]ounsel for a person
who is financially unable to obtain ...

expert[s] ... necessary for adequate representation

may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding.., that services are necessary
and that the person is financially unable to attain them, the court ... shall authorize
counsel to obtain the services.").
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The combination of more petitions and lengthier hearings with
expert presentations on both sides will likely lead to longer wait times
for death row inmates. This, then, will perpetuate the cycle of an
increased number of claims, as the death row phenomenon indicates
that longer times on death row lead to declining mental health.'
Thus, the new standard and its variable application will have severe
negative effects on judicial economy, as well as the health and wellbeing of the inmates.
Another possible consequence of the vague new standard is the
risk that death row inmates will exaggerate their symptoms.' While
the claims likely to "receive a hard look will be offenders similar to
Panetti-those with a history of severe mental disorder[s], whose
diagnoses are uncontested, and who manifest acute symptoms of
cognitive disorganization, hallucinations, or delusions," there is
"some risk of exaggerated symptoms" in some circumstances. 9 This
risk could potentially increase the number of petitions filed and
adjudicated.
Like the risk of exaggeration of symptoms, there is also the
problem of negative incentives.
The new lower standard for
incompetency could create incentives for defense attorneys to leave
mental illness untreated or, worse yet, to advise defendants to refuse
treatment. 90 Were this to occur, more petitions would undoubtedly
be filed and more litigation would result, not to mention that the lack
of treatment would also negatively affect the mental health of death
row inmates. 9 For the aforementioned reasons, the new standard will
have serious ramifications on judicial economy despite the stated
intentions of the Court.
Through the Panetti decision, the Court changed the standard for
competency and created more problems than it solved: Scott Panetti
faces another hearing on his competency; the lower courts must
grapple with establishing a new definition and test; there is a serious
possibility of disparate application among lower courts; and there
almost certainly will be negative ramifications on judicial economy.

87. See Hudson, supranote 61, at 835.
88. See Bonnie supra note 49, at 281-82 (doubting that there would be much
fabrication under the Panetti precedent but admitting that it was a concern expressed by
the Court).
89. See id. at 282.
90. See Bonnie, supra note 70, at 1176 (acknowledging that "condemned prisoners
and their lawyers would have powerful incentives to allow mental illness to remain
untreated," especially if Ford claims were allowed before execution was imminent).
91. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
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The solution, then, is to reassess this decision and to create a brightline test.
While there are other solutions, such as improving mental heath
facilities and establishing higher standards for competency to stand
trial, these are beyond the scope of this Recent Development.
Rather, this Recent Development contends that the Court should join
the suggestions of the amici,1 who suggest that there is no meaningful
way to define "rational understanding" and, therefore, that there
should be certain severe mental illnesses which would categorically
exclude a defendant from capital punishment.93 Such a rule would
likely be overinclusive, but it would rectify some of the problems that
a vague standard creates. While it would grant certain defendants a
stay of execution despite their ability to rationally understand, it
would not be underinclusive, and, thus, there would be no
uncorrectable mistakes.94 Furthermore, application would be much
easier, and petitions would only be filed in situations where a positive
diagnosis has already been made and documented. While a brightline rule may create incentives to "expert shop" in order to secure a
per se diagnosis for incompetency, this type of negative consequence
would still create more consistency across jurisdictions. Likewise,
experts are more likely to differ on a rational understanding test than
on a concrete diagnosis. Thus, the Supreme Court's current system of
hearing cases and refusing to define the level of insanity that makes
execution unconstitutional will lead to more difficult cases like that of
Scott Panetti. Defendants will sit on death row, hours away from
execution, before being granted last-minute stays and vast, complex,
and costly hearings. The solution is a bright-line rule, which will be
easily applied and will provide each mentally ill defendant with an
equal chance to present evidence of his incompetency regardless of
jurisdiction.

92. The parties that filed briefs as amici curiae in support of the petitioner include the
American Psychological Association, the American Psychiatric Association, and the
National Alliance on Mental Health. See Brief for American Psychological Association et
al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct.
2848 (2007) (No. 06-6407).
93. See id. at 3 (noting that "scientific knowledge about schizophrenia and
schizoaffective disorder supports the conclusion that persons in Panetti's condition cannot
rationally understand the reasons for their execution" and that rational understanding is
essential to competency).
94. This Recent Development would also suggest that if the defendant met a brightline test, the prosecution could rebut the presumption of incompetency with evidence
proving competency. This would limit the underinclusion but would keep incompetent
defendants from facing execution under a malleable standard.
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The decision the Panetti Court made will create more confusion,
more petitions and unequal application. Furthermore, it is unlikely
that the new standard will last long before the Court must again
determine the capacity required to be executed. The Court hides
behind the Ford decision in determining that Scott Panetti's
competency was not assessed correctly.95 This "punt" most likely
reflects the difficulty of the task facing the Court: trying to preserve
the death penalty, while at the same time recognizing the injustice of
executing the mentally ill. The decision, however, raises other issues
from which the Court appears to be hiding. For example, the Court
does not address the fact that mentally incompetent individuals must
have a rational understanding to be executed, but that no such
understanding is required for incarceration. Nor does the Court
explain why a person who shows no increased incompetency can be
deemed incompetent to be executed, but competent to stand trial
and, moreover, to do so pro se. The Court avoids these questions by
shirking its responsibility to shed light on the breadth of the Eighth
Amendment, placing the burden on the lower courts instead.
Considering the profound impact this will have on the lower courts,
the Court will no doubt be forced to revisit this decision. When it
does, it would be wise to announce a bright-line rule, one which
provides mentally ill defendants with a fair and equal chance at
proving their incompetency.
LAUREN

E. PERRY

95. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (discussing the Panetti dissent's
critique of the majority's manipulation of Ford).

